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MICHAEL M. KARAYANNI 2
MULTICULTURAL JURISPRUDENCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
CULTURAL DEFENCE is a collection of essays written by social science and legal
scholars from various countries on the normative propriety, meanings, and
implications of what is known as "the cultural defence."3 Although the concept
of the cultural defence may appear to be broad and elusive, a clear and limited
dilemma figures prominently throughout this book: to what extent should a
court in a criminal proceeding take into consideration a defendant's cultural
motivation for the purpose of determining criminal culpability, punishment, or
both?4 With the exception of a few cases, the discussion centres on the treat-
1. Review Essay of Marie Claire Foblets & Alison Dundes Renteln, MulticulturalJurisprudence:
Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 378 pages.
2. Director, Harry and Michael Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law,
and Edward S. Silver Chair in Civil Procedure, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. The research conducted for writing this review essay was supported by the Israel
Science Foundation (grant 385/05).
3. This collection is preceded by a book by editor Alison Dundes Renteln, who examines "the
cultural defence" with particular emphasis on the United States. See Alison Dundes Renteln,
The Cultural Defence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
4. As Gordon Woodman states, the subject matter of the whole collection is "the question of
whether or not people whose conduct conforms to rules of conduct prescribed by their
culture are to be considered guilty and thus subject to punishment for the mere reason
that their behaviour clashes with the rules of the dominant (national/official) legal
system." Gordon R. Woodman, "The Cultural Defence in English Common Law: The
Potential for Development" in Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1, 7 at 7. Brenda Carina
Oude Breuil, another contributor, perceives the overarching issue as being: "to what
extent, if at all, should cultural imperatives mitigate punishment?" Brenda Carina Oude
Breuil, "Dealing with the Ethnic Other in Criminal Law Practice: a Case Study from the
Netherlands" in Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1, 287 at 287-88. Interestingly, the editors
allow for a much broader meaning of cultural defence in their introduction. They note,
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ment of the cultural defence by Western legal systems in situations where the
person invoking the defence is a non-Western immigrant or a member of an
indigenous minority community.' The book's contributors consider a variety
of culturally motivated crimes, the most prominent being those motivated by
so-called family honour (i.e., when individuals inflict harm on, or even commit
the murder of, female family members in response to perceived culturally
indecent behaviour).6 There is also another group of cases concerning practices
that contradict the acceptable legal norms of the dominant society (or host
country), even though the practices are considered harmless, or requisite, accord-
ing to the cultural norms of the minority community (or country of origin).
Examples of such situations include the Sikh who refuses to remove his turban
while riding a motorcycle, despite regulations that mandate the use of a helmet;'
the Muslim imam who faces a charge of criminal discrimination in the Nether-
"[i]ndeed, some of the contributors have different ideas about what constitutes a cultural
defence. While some view it as primarily a criminal law matter, others consider the role of
cultural factors in other fields of law, eg, child welfare, housing codes and asylum
jurisprudence." Alison Dundes Renteln & Marie-Claire Foblets, "Introduction" in Foblets
&r Renreln- mpJra nnre 1 1 ,r 9 Ac rh, Airnr ,l c -L-n r Ar erima nte rest inthe
collection was "to find different approaches to the study of culture conflict in legal
proceedings" (at 1). Instead of proposing a fixed definition of the cultural defence, the
editors "left it to the participants to analyse the role of cultural factors in legal processes, as
they saw fit" (at 2). It would have been helpful to understand exactly how the subject of
the book was presented to the authors. This does not, however, change the general scope
of the collection, which pertains mainly to the use of culture in criminal proceedings.
5. One contributor refers to an intra-Western conflict: the prosecution of a Frenchman in
nineteenth-century England for murder. He was accused of participating in a duel with
another Frenchman who was killed. The accused sought acquittal for the reason that,
according to French culture, the action did not amount to murder. The English court
rejected the claim. See Woodman, ibid. at 16 (discussing R. v. BarronetandAllain (1852),
169 E.R. 633). Although the focus on Western legal systems is made clear from the
beginning, discussing the place of the cultural defence in a non-Western context would have
broadened the discussion.
6. See Barbara Truffin & Csar Arjona, "The Cultural Defence in Spain" in Foblets & Renteln,
supra note 1, 85 at 98-101; Mirjam Siesling & Jeroen Ten Voorde, "The Paradox of Cultural
Differences in Dutch Criminal Law" in Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1, 145 at 150, 160-68;
and Sylvia Maier, "Honor Killings and the Cultural Defence in Germany" in Foblets &
Renteln, supra note 1, 229. See also John L. Caughey, "The Anthropologist as Expert Witness:
the Case of a Murder in Maine" in Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1, 321 at 321-22, 329-33.
7. Woodman, supra note 4 at 17.
REVIEW ESSAY 373
lands for stating in a televised interview that homosexuality is a disease;8 and
even cases of adults who are prosecuted for spanking or having sexual relations
with children-all in compliance with their own acceptable cultural norms.9
The interrelationship between culture and the criminal justice system is dis-
cussed at length with respect to the cultural practices of certain communities,
including the Romani in Spain (i.e., cases of vengeance, the effect of Romani
marriages, trespass, et cetera),1" the Aborigines in Australia (i.e., the imposition
of payback on the wrongdoer and its effect on criminal proceedings)," the
Chinese in the United States (i.e., honour-motivated criminal acts related to
"loss of face"), 12 as well as cases in South Africa, where the use of witchcraft has
led to murders. 3
Criminal law is designed to determine the culpability of the accused and to
impose an appropriate punishment-as such, it embodies an array of doctrines
that can potentially offer recognition to the cultural defence. One such doctrine
contemplates the "guilty mind" (mens rea) of the accused at the time that he or
she is committing the acts that form the crime (actus reus). Within this context,
the cultural identity of the accused and the cultural environment in which he or
she was raised may play an important role in influencing a person to take "cul-
turally-driven actions" that he or she believed to be culturally mandated or
sanctioned. Multicultural Jurisprudence provides a thorough review of whether
such a state of mind can serve as an excuse from criminal liability, even if it
cannot justify the acts themselves."
8. Siesling & Voorde, supra note 6 at 153.
9. Ibid at 148-49 (referring to the beating of boys by Moroccan staff members at a special institute
in Amsterdam for Moroccan boys); Woodman, supra note 4 at 30-31 (referring to a forty-year-
old Caribbean man who was prosecuted for having sexual relations with the twelve-year-old
daughter of his partner and to a Nigerian woman who inflicted facial scars on her two sons).
10. Truffin & Arjona, supra note 6. See also Joke Kusters, "Criminalising Romani Culture
through Law" in Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1, 199.
11. Simon Bronitt, "Visions of a Multicultural Criminal Law: an Australian Perspective" in
Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1, 121.at 133.
12. Cher Weixia Chen, "A Critique of'Loss of Face' Arguments in Cultural Defence Cases: a
Comparative Study" in Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1,247.
13. Pieter A. Carstens, "The Cultural Defence in Criminal Law: South African Perspectives" in
Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1, 175 at 175-77.
14. See Woodman, supra note 4 at 16. See also Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, "Culture, Crime and
Culpability: Perspectives on the Defence of Provocation" in Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1, 35.
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Courts have generally rejected the cultural defence.1" In some cases, the
concern for integrating and assimilating minority members into the dominant
society has been put forward as an interest militating against the acceptance of
the cultural defence.16 The willingness of the courts in Germany to take a
defendant's cultural background into consideration in honour killing cases, for
example, was perceived to be a result of Germany's flawed approach to integra-
tion and multiculturalism." In other cases, concerns have been raised over the
potential threatening and balkanizing nature of the cultural defence to the existing
legal order, especially in culturally diverse countries.-
At this stage, it may be useful to review the Canadian experience with the
cultural defence. In light of Canada's general commitment to multiculturalism,
the Department of Justice published a consultation paper in 1994 that pro-
posed, inter alia, the addition of a cultural defence to the General Part of
Canada's Criminal Code.19 According to the proposal, a person "would be
found not guilty for conduct that would otherwise be criminal when the
person acted in accordance with his or her customs or beliefs."2 This initia-
tive was not successful due to opposition from different interest groups, as
well as opposition from the House of Commons on the basis that recognition
of the cultural defence would undermine basic individual rights,21 such as the
15. See Alison Dundes Renteln, "The Use and Abuse of the Cultural Defence" in Foblets &
Renteln, supra note 1, 61 at 61 (noting that "judges are often disinclined to allow the
introduction of such evidence [pertaining to the accused's culture] and exclude it as
'irrelevant"'). See also Maneesha Deckha, "The Paradox of the Cultural Defence: Gender
and Cultural Othering in Canada" in Foblets & Renteln, supra note 1, 261 at 261-62;
Truffin & Arjona, supra note 6 at 90-91. A noticeable exception is that of South Africa,
where there seems to be more room for the cultural defence. See Carstens, supra note 13
at 194.
16. See Woodman, supra note 4 at 33.
17. Maier, supra note 6 at 230J.
18. Amirthalingam, supra note 14 at 4 3.
19. See Charmaine M. Wong, "Good Intentions, Troublesome Applications: The Cultural
Defence and Other Uses of Cultural Evidence in Canada" (1999) 42 Crim. L.Q. 367.
20. Ibid. at 367.
21. Ibid. at 368. Notwithstanding this official stance, it has been argued that the courts in
Canada have effectively considered a defendant's cultural background in order to reduce
charges, mitigate sentences, and affect the determination of whether the defendant had the
requisite mes rea for the crime for which he or she is being tried (at 372).
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general right to equality guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.22
In contrast to this dominant approach, several of the contributors suggest
that legislatures and courts should, in fact, be more accommodating to the cul-
tural defence. Two primary justifications are put forth in favour of this approach.
The first justification addresses the individual's subjective state of mind when
acting according to his or her cultural understanding. This justification builds
on the notion that growing up within a community leads to "enculturation
[which] shapes individuals' perceptions and influences their actions."23 As a result,
the quest for individualized justice, as embodied by criminal law in particular,
demands recognition for the cultural defence. According to Alison Dundas
Renteln, "[taking a person's cultural background into account is fundamen-
tally no different from judges' taking into consideration other social attributes
such as gender, age and mental state.""4 This argument resonates with liberal
multiculturalism, especially the notion of justifying group rights on the basis of
serving individual autonomy. Liberal multiculturalism posits that individuals-
because of who they are as individuals-require group-based accommodations."5
More specifically, because individuals are embedded in their culture to the extent
that it becomes a part of what defines them as a person, liberal multiculturalism
seeks to protect culture in order to protect individuals themselves.
A second justification in support of the cultural defence is embedded in the
hierarchy of power that exists within majority-minority relations. Dominant
norms in society, against which the actions of individual members are evalu-
ated, are formed and shaped by existing hegemonic interests, namely those of
the majority. 6 Thus, when the cultural defence is not recognized by the legal
system, minority cultures become more marginalized and excluded. 7 John L.
Caughey notes in his essay that "[a] trial is a cultural ritual, crime a cultural
construct, and the court a cultural apparatus that represents and enforces the
22. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 15 [Charter].
23. Renteln, supra note 15 at 62.
24. Ibid.
25. See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989);
Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective" (1994) 41 Dissent 67.
26. See Amirthalingam, supra note 14 at 36; Bronitt, supra note 11 at 123.
27. Ibid.
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dominant culture's values and perspectives. '28 The hegemonic structure in soci-
ety at large is also endemic in court-formed perceptions. Quoting Edwin
Cameron, Pieter A. Carstens writes that:
Judges do not enter public office as ideological virgins. They ascend the Bench with
built-in and often strongly held sets of values, preconceptions, opinions and preju-
dices. These are invariably expressed in the decisions they give, constituting
'inarticulate premises' in the process of judicial reasoning.
29
By failing to recognize the cultural defence, courts working under the influence
of hegemonic ideals are acting to further entrench majority dominance.
This sentiment should not be taken to imply that, each and every time a
defendant waves the cultural banner, he or she should be exonerated. In endorsing
a reconsideration of the cultural defence, the contributors provide a set of qualifi-
cations with the clear intention to control the possible misuse of the cultural
defence in criminal proceedings. First, as a matter of criminal law theory, the
cultural defence should be seen as a circumstance of excuse rather than a justifica-
tion.30 Second, in order to minimize potential misuse, Renteln offers a set of basic
queries for the court to consider: "(1) Is the litigant a member of the ethnic
group? (2) Does the group have such a tradition? (3) Was the litigant influenced
by the tradition when he or she acted?"31 Cher Weixia Chen suggests in her
contribution that we should also look at the legal norms and practices that exist
within the immigrant's country of origin in order to determine whether that legal
system does or does not accommodate the particular cultural defence.3 2 Although
US courts have, in some cases, entertained the "loss of face" defence raised by
members of the Chinese community, she notes that Chinese law does not, in fact,
regard "loss of face" as a mitigating factor.
33
The contributors raise some additional concerns regarding the implications
of recognizing culture in criminal proceedings. One concern is that certain
members of the minority, whose culture is being invoked in order to mitigate
28. Caughey, supra note 6 at 323.
29. Edwin Cameron, "Judicial Accountability in South Africa" (1990) 6 S.A.J.H.R. 251, cited in
Carstens, supra note 13 at 195. See also Deckha, supra note 15 at 263.
30. Amirthalingam, supra note 14 at 46-47.
31. Renteln, supranote 15 at64.
32. Chen, supra note 12 at 256-57.
33. Ibid. at 257.
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the criminal liability of the accused, may receive less legal protection if the
cultural defence is accepted. " In the vast majority of cases, vulnerable members
of a community (i.e., women and children) are often the victims of culturally
motivated offences.3" In this clash between culture and individual rights, Ren-
teln posits a general solution: "[t]he right to culture is an important human
right, but it should be protected only so long as it does not undermine other
human rights."3
A second, connected concern deals with the encouragement of cultural
essentialism and the stereotyping of particular constituencies. 7 Discussing
crimes committed by members of immigrant minorities in the framework of a
cultural defence by repeatedly referring to culture as the primary cause for the
criminal act runs the risk of tagging the whole culture as monolithic, static, and
backward.38 Ultimately, the dominant Western legal culture in which the defence
is raised emerges as progressive, and the culture of the minority group is depicted
as primitive, childish, and irresponsible." Dealing with honour killings in
Germany and building on previous scholarship on the topic, Sylvia Maier ex-
emplifies how an act of killing can be characterized as a crime of passion when
the parties belong to the dominant Western majority or as a crime of honour
when the parties belong to the immigrant, non-Western minority."5 There does
not appear to be a simple solution for this dilemma. Maneesha Deckha writes
that "[t]o dissociate culture from violence would do violence to the concept of
34. See Renteln, supra note 15 at 64 (noting that "[w]here cultural traditions involve irreparable
harm to vulnerable groups, the defence should not influence the disposition of cases").
35. Deckha, supra note 15 at 273; Amirthalingam, supra note 14 at 43-44.
36. See Renteln, supra note 15 at 82. For a similar argument made in the Canadian context, see
Wong, supra note 19 at 391-92.
37. This has indeed been a major concern in the literature dealing with the cultural defence. For
a Canadian-based discussion, see Pascale Fournier, "The Ghettoisation of Difference in
Canada: 'Rape by Culture' and the Danger of a 'Cultural Defence' in Criminal Law Trials"
(2002) 29 Man. L.J. 81.
38. See e.g. Breuil, supra note 4 at 292-95; Siesling & Voorde, supra note 6 at 154. For previous
work on the subject, see Led Volpp, "Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior" (2000) 12 Yale J.
L. & Human. 89.
39. Deckha, supra note 15 at 266.
40. Maier, supra note 6 at 234. See also Lama Abu-Odeh, "Comparatively Speaking: The
'Honor' of the 'East' and the 'Passion' of the 'West"' (1997) 1997 Utah L. Rev. 287.
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violence itself," 1 but any justification of "discursive, bodily or structural violence"
must be approached critically." Kumaralingam Amirthalingam meanwhile con-
cludes that:
Cultural accommodation has to be a two-way street: minority cultures need to rec-
ognise that they have an obligation to respect and obey the general laws of the
nation-state to which they belong ... [and] the majority have to accept that a global
human culture is slowly evolving, which will be shaped by a diversity of norms.
A rather distinctive approach can be found in the Netherlands, where calls have
been made in Parliament and by prosecutors to apply harsher punishments to
culturally motivated crimes such as honour killings."
A third concern raised by some of the contributors questions how litigants
should produce evidence before a court that is willing to consider the cultural
defence,"5 and who should constitute an expert witness in such a case."' Mirjam
Siesling and Jeroen Ten Voorde highlight in their essay the dilemma that is
faced by Dutch courts when they are considering evidence regarding a particular
culture. Dutch law embodies a special doctrine of judicial restraint that precludes
judges from evaluating the content of cultural norms.4 7 But what if the judge
does not have a clear understanding of the relevant culture or, worse, what if
the judge hears contradictory expert testimony? This puts the judge into a
seemingly irresolvable dilemma: "if he does deal with culture ... he risks violating
the doctrine of interpretive restraint. If he does not discuss culture, he reaches a
half-hearted verdict that will leave everyone dissatisfied." 8
Overall, MulticulturalJurisprudence is a rich and valuable guide for analyzing
the meaning and legal treatment of the cultural defence in courts around the
world, particularly with respect to criminal proceedings. The scientific bibliog-
41. Deckha, supra note 15 at 284.
42. Ibid.
43. Amirthalingam, supra note 14 at 60.
44. Siesling & Voorde, supra note 6 at 160-61, 167.
45. See e.g. Renteln, supra note 15 at 81; Chen, supra note 12 at 254-55. For a similar discussion
in the Canadian context, see Robert J. Currie, "The Contextualised Court: Litigating
'Culture' in Canada" (2005) 9 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 73.
46. See Caughey, supra note 6 at 329-33 (stressing the particular relevance of "anthropological
testimony").
47. Siesling & Voorde, supra note 6 at 152.
48. Ibid. at 153.
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raphy is helpful in providing tips on how to search for scholarly work on the
subject, and it contains the sources cited in the collection as well as other
relevant material.
In this review essay, I would like to offer a response to some of the issues
that are dealt with in the collection. In doing so, I seek less to debate the analytical
methodologies that are employed in the different essays (though I will discuss
an issue regarding the terminology used by the different contributors). The
monograph is, after all, a collection of essays authored by scholars of different
disciplines, drawn from different legal systems, and, therefore, there will under-
standably be differences in the contributors' treatment of a subject that is
intrinsically related to localized norms and ideals. To their credit, the editors of
the book acknowledge from the start that the essays "do not share a common
conceptual framework," 9 and that this conflict should be anticipated, given
that the authors lack "a common conception of the cultural defence"5" to begin
with. Iistead, I will focus on some of the observations and suggestions, made
by several of the contributors, that are relevant to my scholarly interests in
multiculturalism-primarily in regards to my own community, the Palestinian-
Arab minority in Israel-and in private international law (or, as it is also known,
conflict of laws)."
I. TERMINOLOGY
My first comment addresses the terminology that is used by the contributors in
two different contexts: 1) to denote the factual reality of the existence of different
minorities who happen to abide by specific bodies of cultural norms that are dif-
ferent from those that exist in the minorities' host countries, and 2) to denote the
normative reality or ideal in a legal system that, in seeking to accommodate its cul-
tural minorities, establishes group-specific norms and policies, including group
autonomy and the preservation of cultural institutions such as language. The
book's tide, MulticulturalJurisprudence, creates a powerful impression that it is the
normative aspects of these terms that are used in the different essays. However, in
reading the collection, one finds a rather confusing or disjointed narrative.
49. Renteln & Foblets, "Introduction," supra note 4 at 2.
50. Ibid. at 1.
51. See e.g. Lawrence Collins, ed., Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws, 14th ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) vol. 1 at 36.
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For instance, the term "multiculturalism," or. more specifically "liberal
multiculturalism," has come to denote circumstances in which a minority group
should be accommodated in the name of its individual members' well-being, as
opposed to only in the name of the well-being of the group.5 2 The mere fact
that certain circumstances are characterized as multicultural connotes the positive
nature of the society in question, portraying it-as tolerant and considerate of
different groups. The terms "legal relativism" and "legal pluralism" have also
attracted the attention of theorists. 3 Relativists, as Michael Freeman reminds
us, call our attention to the meanings and ramifications of these concepts and
remind us to "regard all values as the products of the customs, practices and
beliefs."54 According to the relativist understanding of norms, "we ask not
whether social practices like child marriage or female circumcision are justified
by the moral considerations that we find convincing, but rather whether they
are sanctioned by the relevant social understandings of the cultures within
which they are practised."5 Freeman concludes by noting that there can be no
objective standards in legal relativism for reconciling the values of different tra-
ditions because what is regarded as objective and reasonable are themselves the
"product of particular cultures."56 Legal pluralism differs from legal relativism
precisely on the latter issue. Pluralism assumes that there are primary values that
are independent of culture and can be referred to in order to settle conflicts.57
How do some of the contributors refer to these concepts of multiculturalism,
relativism, and pluralism? In his essay, "Visions of a Multicultural Criminal Law,"
Simon Bronitt states that "Australia is a multicultural society."58 To substantiate
this claim, he cites the official Australian census, which statistically details
52. Michael Mousa Karayanni, "Multiculture Me No More! On Multicultural Qualifications
and the Palestinian-Arab Minority of Israel" (2007) 54 Diogenes 39 at 43.
53. See e.g. John J. Tilley, "The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism" (1998) 11 Ratio
Juris 272; John Griffiths, "What is Legal Pluralism?" (1986) 24 J. Legal Pluralism &
Unofficial L. 1.
54. Michael Freeman, "Images of Child Welfare in Child Abduction Appeals" in John
Murphy, ed., Ethnic Minorities, their Families and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000)
3 at 12, 11-14.
55. Ibid. at 12.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid. at 13.
58. Bronitt, supra note 11 at 121.
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Australia's current, ethnically diverse society. Multiculturalism thus becomes
synonymous with an ethnically diverse society.59 Bronitt also refers to the 1989
official government report, A National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, in
which the normative substance of multiculturalism in Australia is presented
as one that seeks to protect "core liberal values and the rights of individuals rather
than communities."" This observation is striking for a few reasons. First, mul-
ticulturalism is now referred to as denoting a normative reality. Second it
totally disregards the fact that multiculturalism, in its liberal form, has explicitly
come to call for group rights rather than just the guarantee of core liberal values.6
The individual is held to have a right to culture, and, in order to uphold that
right, culture must be protected at the level of the community, which is the
only level at which a group's living language and traditions can exist.6 2 Multi-
culturalism therefore means much more than simply an ethnically, religiously,
or culturally diverse society. If these were the only criteria, then the Soviet Union
and segregated America might be considered "multicultural." At best, diversity
presents us with what can be described as the "circumstance of multiculturalism."63
Multiculturalism refers to a set of values that seeks to legitimize and consciously
accommodate diversity.
A similarly problematic usage of terms can be found in the essay, ."Cultural
Defence and Societal Dynamics," written by Erik Claes and Jogchum
Vrielink.6' Although very much aware of the philosophical coherence of the
term "cultural relativism, '6 the contributors explain that modern societies have
come to deal with the reality of '"different ethnic groups ... living together under
59. Ibid. A similar perception was evident in Siesling & Voorde, supra note 6 at 145 (noting that
"[a]s a consequence of ongoing immigration, Dutch society has become increasingly
multicultural").
60. Bronitt, supra note 11 at 121 [emphasis in original].
61. See Kymlicka, supra note 25; Raz, supra note 25; and Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism" (1998)
11 Ratio Juris 193.
62. Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, "Liberalism and the Right to Culture" (1994) 61
Soc. Research 491.
63. See Paul Joseph Kelly, "Introduction: Between Culture and Equality" in Paul Joseph Kelly,
ed., Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and its Critics (Malen: Polity Press in
association with Blackwell Publishers, 2002) 1 at 3.
64. Erik Claes & Jogchum Vrielink, "Cultural Defence and Societal Dynamics" in Foblets &
Renteln, supra note 1, 301.
65. Ibid. at 311, n. 31.
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the same societal context" by developing "a collective attitude, cultural relativism,
which in its essence comes down to a positive embracing of multicultural pluralism
and a self-critical attitude to one's own cultural predispositions (anti-
ethnocentrism). 66 Yet, as Freeman notes, the essence of relativism, when discussing
culture in the context of legal norms, is the conception that no particular value
possesses any authority outside the cultural context from where it was produced.
How is it, then, that the values of multiculturalism and pluralism, themselves
conceptually loaded formulas, can work within the concept of relativism? It
would have been helpful if the editors had clarified and established the range of
meaning of such basic terms as multiculturalism, relativism, and pluralism in
the introduction of their book.
II. QUALIFYING THE CULTURAL DEFENCE
I mentioned earlier that Renteln and, to some extent, Chen offer factors intended
to help courts determine whether a certain cultural defence should or should
not qualify. In addition to causal factors, such as whether the litigant is a member
of the ethnic group and whether or not he or she was influenced by the tradition,
the contributors suggest that one should also refer to the status of the practice
within the group. in fact, it becomes essential to ask whether "the group [has]
such a tradition."67 Chen's suggestion to inquire into the standing of the defence
in the legal system of the defendant's country of origin is also important. To
further this effort, especially in light of the concern about essentialism, I would
add another line of inquiry that assesses the extent to which a group approves of
the practice and the level of consensus within that group regarding the culturally
motivated act. if the majority within the cultural group condemns certain prac-
tices, a court should consider this circumstance when determining the validity
of the particular cultural defence. If generally applicable norms have undergone
a certain process in order to qualify as official state norms, it follows that cultural
norms should likewise undergo a qualification process in order to represent a
certain culture.
In this respect, I would like to refer to a study conducted within my own
community: Attitudes Towards the Status and Rights of Palestinian Women in
66. Ibid. at 311.
67. Renteln, supra note 15 at 64.
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Israel6 In this study, a staff of researchers set out to inquire about perceptions
among the members of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel on a wide spectrum
of issues concerning Palestinian-Arab women, including the rights to employment
and political participation, and, in particular, so-called family honour crimes. Al-
though the murder of women in the name of family honour--or honour killings,
as commonly referred to in Israel-is a marginal phenomenon, there are still, on
average, ten such cases every year (in a population of about one million).69
In surveys conducted among the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel, it was
found that 25.1 per cent of men expressed "understanding" for honour killings,
and an additional 12.8 per cent expressed "strong understanding."7" Perhaps
more disturbing, however, was that 22.1 per cent of women shared similar sen-
timents.7 The data also showed that attitudes pertaining to honour killings
varied relative to the respondents' level of education, geographic location, and
socioeconomic status." It may not be surprising, then, that Israeli courts have
generally rejected the cultural defence for family honour killings in cases involv-
ing a Palestinian-Arab defendant.73 Indeed, a legislative initiative that would
require the courts to impose a harsher sentence for honour killings is currently
pending at the Israeli Ministry of Justice. 7"
68. Women Against Violence, Attitudes Towards the Status and Rights of Palestinian Women in
Israel (Nazareth: Women Against Violence, 2005). Dr. Hunaida Ghanem was the work's
chief researcher.
69. See Aida Touma-Sliman, "Culture, national minority and the state: working against the
'crime of family honour' within the Palestinian community in Israel" in Lynn Wlechman &
Sara Hossain, eds., 'Honour, 'Crime Paradigms and Violence Against Women (London: Zed
Books, 2005) 181 at 182.
70. See Women Against Violence, supra note 68 at 154.
71. Ibid. According to the same study, 13.0 per cent of the women surveyed expressed
"understanding" for honour killings, while 9.1 per cent expressed "strong understanding."
72. Ibid. at 155. In her contribution, Maier notes a similar connection among the Turkish
community in Germany. Maier, supra note 6 at 237.
73. See e.g. The State ofIsrael v. Hasson (1998), Criminal File 217/95 (Dist. Ct. Haifa). Honour
killings are, however, barely investigated, and the law enforcement authorities, who handle
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In cases where a minority tradition exists that is considered non-normative by
the majority and subsequently criminalized, I argue that it is not sufficient to
merely ask whether such a tradition exists in the community. Before a cultural
defence qualifies for consideration, it should be proven that a majority among the
relevant community, perhaps even an overwhelming one, approves of the tradition.
I have one caveat-again, based on the Israeli experience-in response to
Chen's suggestion to check the legal status of the cultural defence in the country
of origin. Although a specific cultural defence might appear in the law books, it
could, in fact, be culturally archaic. For example, section 91 of the Israeli Civil
Wrongs Ordinance (the main statute defining tort norms in Israel) recognizes a
traditional conflict-resolution method under which a tribal dispute caused by the
infliction of serious bodily harm, usually causing death, may be resolved through
a special payment called di'ah.75 Following this traditional method would prevent
a court dealing with a civil tort action from ordering the payment of damages.
The di'ah is somewhat akin to the Australian practice of "payback." However, this
form of settling disputes, despite being officially recognized, is now considered
obsolete7" and should not qualify as a basis for a cultural defence.
III. THE RECOGNITION OF THE CULTURAL DEFENCE IN
RELATION TO INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Almost all of the contributors who showed sympathy for the cultural defence
were also strongly aware of its possible clash with the interests of certain vulnerable
individuals such as women and children. Mitigating the criminal liability of
offenders necessarily makes those members of society even more vulnerable. A
similar concern with promoting the concept of the cultural defence is the essen-
tialism inherent in defining minority cultures' norms and traditions. Using the
cultural practices of a certain minority to limit the criminal liability of one of its
members risks characterizing the entire culture as backward. However attuned the
contributors are to the perils of the cultural defence, the answers they provide to
resolve such concerns are far from satisfactory. A general observation by Renteln
that "[t]he right to culture is an important human right," but one that "should be
75. Civil Wrong Ordinance (New Version), 2. L.S.I. (N.V.) 5, s. 91.
76. 1 have managed to find only one Israeli case in which the defendant asked that the action be
dismissed on the base of a di'ah payment, and, even then, the request was declined. See
Hamda v. Ibrahim (1975), Civil Action 25/74, Petition 934/75 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem).
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protected only so long as it does not undermine other human rights" is in-
genuous." Given the centrality of this predicament, especially in situations
where a cultural defence is considered in a criminal prosecution that involves a
victim whose basic rights have been violated, it would be of great interest to
develop a defence that does not infringe on the rights of others. The literature
dealing with multiculturalism has focused intensively on similar predicaments.
Many scholars, however, have come to realize that group accommodations,
made in the name of protecting the right to culture of the group's individual
members, may directly or indirectly sanction the application of group norms
that are of an anti-liberal nature, particularly toward women and children.78
Multiculturalism has since made significant advances toward mitigating this
problem, whether by differentiating between accommodations that protect the
minority group from the majority (external protections) and those that allow the
application of anti-liberal norms to their members (internal restrictions)," or by
guaranteeing an exit route for individual members of the minority community
to free themselves from community-practiced norms.8" These and other sugges-
tions can be helpful when dealing with the conflict between the cultural
defence, on the one hand, and the interest in guaranteeing basic human rights,
on the other.
A direct consequence of this understanding is that the less capable individual
members of the minority community are of leaving their community, the less op-
portunity they have to become full members of the dominant society-and, as
such, the more wary we should be in granting recognition to the cultural defence.8
77. Renteln, supra note 15 at 82.
78. See-e.g. Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev, eds., Minorities within Minorities: Equality,
Rights and Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Ayelet Shachar,
Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women s Rights (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); and Leslie Green, "Internal Minorities and their Rights" in Will
Kymlicka, ed., The Rights ofMinority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 257
at 258.
79. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995) at 35-44.
80. Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" (1992) 20 Pol. Theory 105.
81. Cf Alison Dundes Renteln & Marie-Claire Foblets, "Conclusion" in Foblets & Renteln,
supra note 1, 335 at 338.
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IV. THE CULTURAL DEFENCE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
Despite the novelty of the focus on the conflict between the cultural norms of a
particular minority and the otherwise applicable norms of the legal system, dis-
cussion of the conflict between the laws of different states is not a new
phenomenon. Conflict of laws, or private international law, is an entire legal
discipline in and of itself that tries to provide principles and rules for resolving
the conflict between the laws of different states.82 These principles and rules help
courts to determine, for example, which particular state should have jurisdiction
to adjudicate inter-state disputes and which competing law should govern an
underlying relationship. Over time, each country has devised its own rules re-
garding the conditions under which it will recognize and enforce judgments
rendered in other jurisdictions.83 In the regulation of these spheres, various
theories have emerged that have led to variations in conflict of laws rules across
time and different legal orders. This discipline of law is, after all, controlled by
the municipal rules of each state (similar to the laws that pertain to contracts
and torts), unless it is regulated by a treaty or other international instrument."
How then does the cultural defence relate to the area of conflict of laws? 5
The notion of the cultural defence opens a new frontier in standard conflict
of laws thinking that has yet to be fully explored. Whereas the cultural defence
introduces a conflict between norms that originate from the unofficial legal order
of the culture and from the official legal order of the state, conflict of laws is
chiefly preoccupied with the conflict between the official norms of two or more
jurisdictions.86 These two areas, however, may sometimes be interrelated in much
the same way that an older, colonial, religious, or tribal layer of law remains in
82. See Friedrich K. Juenger, "A Page of History" (1984) 35 Mercer L. Rev. 419;
Hessel E. Yntema, "The Historic Bases of Private International Law" (1953) 2 Am. J.
Comp. L. 297.
83. John G. Collier, Conflict of Laws, 3d ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2001) at 3.
84. Ibid. at 5. See also J.J. Fawcett, J.M. Carruthers & Peter North, Cheshire, North &Fawcett:
Private International Law, 14th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 7.
85. In their concluding remarks, the editors allude to the cultural conflicts that arise in a variety
of legal disciplines, including private international law. Renteln & Foblets, "Conclusion,"
supra note 81 at 335.
86. Fawcett, Carruthers & North, supra note 84 at 17.
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practice within the body of the law of a modern state. A close parallel to the
cultural defence conflict can be found in several Middle Eastern legal systems.1
7
In Israel, for example, the local population is still governed by religious norms
in certain spheres of family law, thereby raising potential conflicts between
those religious norms and norms from the general legal order.88 An interesting
challenge that the cultural defence introduces into conflict of laws is the setting
in which a conflict of criminal norms arises-and which the cultural defence
doctrine seeks to resolve. This is an innovative setting in traditional conflict of
laws thinking, in that the discipline does not typically deal with conflict of laws
issues outside the realm of private law.89 In fact, there is a general perception
that, in the sphere of public law-criminal law included-states abide by their
own municipal norms and generally leave no room to discuss possible conflict
between local and foreign criminal laws.9 But the cultural defence discussion,
as revealed through this collection of essays, furnishes us with a choice of law
question in a criminal context, albeit in an intra-state setting. One is thus chal-
lenged to determine whether or not an independent sphere of criminal law
conflicts is emerging that now deserves attention within the conflict of laws field.
MulticulturalJurisprudence is, without doubt, an important addition to the
existing literature on the cultural defence, and it opens new challenges at several
important intersections among the different disciplines that deal with cultural
conflicts. It is the editors' vision that this collection of essays will invite scholars
across the globe and from other disciplines to take up the various challenges
that culture presents in different judicial settings.
87. See Chibli Mallat, Introduction to Middle Eastern Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007) at 364-65.
88. See Amnon Rubinstein, "Law and Religion in Israel" (1967) 2 Isr. L.R. 380; Edoardo Vitta,
The Conflict ofLaws in Matters of Personal Status in Palestine (Tel-Aviv: S. Bursi Ltd., 1947)
at 145-50; and Frederic M. Goadby, International and Inter-Religious Private Law in Palestine
(Jerusalem: Hamadpis Press, 1926) at 115-19.
89. Fawcett, Carruthers & North, supra note 84 at 17.
90. See Collins, supra note 51 at 104-05.

